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[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] Good afternoon. We are pleased to have Profes-
sor Thomas M. Robinson, of the Department of Philosophy of the Uni-
versity of Toronto (Canada), again with us. He visited us on an earlier
occasion when he was in Barcelona. So, welcome again Professor Ro-
binson.
Professor Thomas M. Robinson, whom I met during the early hours
of the V Symposium Platonicum, which took place in Toronto from Au-
gust 19 to 23, 1995, and was dedicated to the study of the Euthydemus,
the Lysis and the Charmides, has written tirelessly about Plato and about
Greek philosophy as a whole. One of his more remarkable texts is undo-
ubtedly Plato’s Psychology (University of Toronto Press, 1970; second
edition 1995). He has also published Contrasting Arguments: An Edition
of the Dissoi Logoi (1979), The Greek Legacy (1979) and Heraclitus:
Fragments (1987). And he has recently completed three volumes of arti-
cles on ancient philosophy. He has given courses and lectured in univer-
sities all over the world. In fact, he is well known to us, and no more
introduction is needed. We would just like to thank him for being here
with us to engage in dialogue about Plato while he is currently in Europe
to give papers in a number of universities. [De fet és conegut de nosaltres
i no en cal més presentació. Tan sols agrair-li el fet d’haver volgut estar
entre nosaltres per dialogar sobre Plató, amb la possibilitat que li donava la
seva estada a Europa en ocasió d’impartir conferències a diverses universi-
tats. Donem-li la paraula i seguidament iniciarem un diàleg amb ell.]
IS THERE A PLATONIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY?
[THOMAS M. ROBINSON] Plato’s writing lifetime encompassed some-
thing like half a century. His extensive writings, some 36 of them, appear
to have survived, miraculously, in their entirety. Since he would, by any
reckoning, have described himself as a philosopher, in at least the etymo-
1. Notes edited by Josep Monserrat-Molas (grup Hermenèutica i Platonisme).
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logical sense of the word if nothing more than that, it should in principle
be relatively simple to excavate from such a mass of material what one
might call a ‘Platonic approach’ to philosophy. But notoriously this has
proved to be something on which there has been from the beginning and
continues to be sharp disagreement among interpreters, ranging from
those who believe that Platonism consists simply of a philosophical appro-
ach, such that the philosophy and the method of philosophizing are one
and the same, to those who believe that the method, roughly describable
as ‘dialogical’, is, among other things, a device for the elaboration of
major ‘doctrine’, such as the theory of transcendental forms or the im-
mortality of the soul. In my paper I shall be looking again at this problem,
and asking myself two specific questions, as follows:
If the major approach to philosophy to be found in the dialogues is
indeed the ‘dialogical’ one, is it the only approach, and if there are others,
what are they?
If it turns out to be the case that there is indeed more to Platonism
than simply a dialogical approach to things, can we pin-point what it is?
We can begin with the question of the dialogical approach to philosophy.
This seems too obvious to merit more than a moment’s attention. Until, that
is, one looks at, say, the Timaeus and the Critias, which have given up all
pretence of being dialogues, or the last great work on which Plato was
working at his death, the Laws, where again we are effectively looking at
a treatise rather than a dialogue. However, it could be argued that the
Laws is still at least vaguely dialogical in structure, and the nature of the
contents of the Timaeus and Critias, it could be argued, are such that
Plato made a deliberate and very understandable exception in their case.
Which would leave us with the still-standing, unexceptionable claim that,
by and large, Plato approached the problems of philosophy dialogically.
As we have already seen, for some interpreters, like Randall, and more
recently, Paviani, the approach and the philosophy are one; a philosopher
uses dialogue as a technique to unmask hidden assumptions about vario-
us terms (usually to do with ethics), and to achieve as much clarity as
we can in the matter by this technique, whether or not we reach such a
degree of clarity that we can finally agree on an acceptable definition of
the term in question. But in putting their case this way Randall and Pavia-
ni and those who think like them have made life easy for themselves in
accepting so unified a vision of the dialogues when this is in fact a major
point at issue for so many other interpreters. Vlastos, for example, spent
much of a lifetime arguing that the so-called ‘Socratic’ or early dialogues
of Plato, which end almost invariably with a failure to define the term
they had set out to define, practice exactly the philosophy attributed by
Randall and Paviani and others to Plato, but it is only those dialogues
which unequivocally do so. Many of the later dialogues, by contrast,
beginning with the Phaedo and the Republic, despite the presence in
many of them of a persona called Socrates, have as their clear agenda the
elaboration of doctrine based on carefully constructed definitions (like
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the definition of justice in the Republic); with rare exceptions (like the
Theaetetus), they finish up defining their moral terms with some exacti-
tude.
On this interpretation, only dialogues from the Phaedo and Republic
onwards are indisputable sources for any talk of a ‘Platonic’ approach to
philosophy. Small, early dialogues like the Lysis or Euthydemus, may on
occasion contain thoughts which, proleptically (to use Kahn’s term), may
prefigure some of Plato’s later thinking (the Gorgias, for example, can
be seen, in terms of its contents, as something of a dry-run for the Repu-
blic), but philosophy-as-method, if that is what the early dialogues con-
sist of, is either a) purely Socratic, or b) something attributed to Socrates
by Plato, whether or not Socrates would have recognized the portrait of
himself, or c) something Plato himself adhered to while writing these
early dialogues (presumably thinking he was following Socrates in so
doing) but turned away from later in life to embark on some philosophi-
cal system-building of his own.
A further complication to all this is added by the fact that, whatever
their differences, real or supposed, Socrates and Plato would undoubte-
dly have agreed that philosophy must be lived. But then they might very
likely have disagreed, at least in part, on the matter of what constituted
living. For Socrates such living seems to have been a very inward-loo-
king ‘care of the soul’, with a minimum of attention (though real enough
and often hazardous enough, as we know from both Xenophon and Pla-
to) to affairs of state and basic civic duties, and a maximum of attention
to ‘getting things right’ as far as possible by the technique of public
dialogue. For Plato much of this would remain true, but from the time of
writing of the Republic onwards, which, on a Vlastos-style interpretation
of the dialogues, is more or less where a Platonic as distinct from a
Socratic approach to philosophy begins, Plato is deeply committed to a
maximal not a minimal attention by all citizens, consonant with their ta-
lents and education, to affairs of state and basic civic duties. Or to put it
a little differently, on a Vlastos-style interpretation of the dialogues So-
crates tends to emphasize saving one’s own soul, Plato to emphasize
saving the state and no doubt thereby one’s individual soul as well.
While there is some plausibility to this general argument, I plan to
accept as my own ground-rule of interpretation something slightly diffe-
rent. And different again, I should add, from the view of those who take
Socratic/Platonic method and Platonism to be synonymous. Scanning
the works of Plato from what by general consent is the earliest or very
close to the earliest that was written, the Apology, to the one on which
he was working when he died, the Laws, I shall attempt to bring to the
fore philosophical stances and commitments which seem to me to be
there for the entire writing period, on the assumption that for Plato if not
for Socrates the dialogue form was a means to an end not an end in
itself, that end being the exposition of some deep commitments that may
have been simply adumbrated earlier on but were then argued for with
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the passage of time. This may have some disconcerting results for various
groups of interpreters, since a number of the commitments that I highlight
will turn out to permeate both the Socratic and the Platonic dialogues
(on a Vlastosian interpretation), while others, even if confined, on that
same interpretation, to so-called Platonic dialogues, will turn out to be
less robustly affirmed than they are sometimes made out to be.
Starting with the latter, one of the twin pillars of Platonism, as they
have been called since Cornford, the Theory of Forms, is only indubita-
bly a part of Platonic thinking in five dialogues, the Phaedo, Sympo-
sium, Republic, Timaeus and Phaedrus , along perhaps with the
Parmenides, where, despite the criticisms levelled against it in the ope-
ning pages of that dialogue, a Theory of Forms, of something very like
it, seems to be re-affirmed as being philosophically indispensable. Many
scholars find further references to the Forms in the Theaetetus, Sophist,
Politicus and Philebus and even Laws as well, though other scholars (and
this includes myself) are much less sure, and feel that by this stage Plato has
begun thinking of essences in re while still retaining a language that once
evoked transcendentalism. Either way, there is very little reason to believe
that, till he wrote the Symposium and Phaedo, perhaps around the age of
forty, Plato adhered to a theory of transcendental forms, or that Socrates
himself ever held any such theory. So the theory of forms as putatively
transcendental entities, despite its fame and pivotal importance for a
large part of Plato’s writing life, in fact fails to meet my ‘life-time phi-
losophical commitment’ criterion as an objective of the dialogic method.
What of the other ‘pillar of Platonism’, the theory of the immortality
of the soul? This, on the face of it, seems to be a much stronger claimant
to such a title, since it seems to be affirmed across the dialogues from
start to finish, with various attempts at proof being put forward in the
Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus and Laws. There are slight anomalies in the
Apology, where Socrates seems to believe in an after-life but not neces-
sarily an eternal one, and in the Symposium, where the eternality of the
human race is affirmed, in a context which appears to contrast this with
unacceptable claims to personal immortality. But this latter should proba-
bly be excluded from the discussion as being simply an anomaly, given
the enormous weight of evidence across the dialogues pointing in the
opposite direction, and the Apology excluded from the discussion as be-
ing clearly an attempt to re-create recent court proceedings, and as such
separate and different in kind from the dialogues to come.
If this is true, the theory of immortality will successfully meet the
‘life-time philosophical commitment’ criterion. But we run into difficul-
ties as soon as we pose the question, The immortality of what? The at-
tempted proofs of immortality scattered across the dialogues, from the Phaedo
to the Laws, strongly suggest that for Plato the only human soul he conside-
red immortal was the rational human soul. In his various eschatological
myths, however, he presents a portrait of the human soul in the afterlife as in
effect an disembodied person wholly analogous to the embodied person, and
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complete with emotional apparatus. The two visions are not, on the face of
it, compatible. One obvious solution to the puzzle is to credit Plato with
the view of soul as purely reason and Socrates, perhaps, with the more
generally accepted view of soul as reason combined with impulse (?). This may
well be correct, but one can never discount, even in the case of a philosopher of
the high intelligence of Plato, the extraordinary ability of humans to hold in the
mind simultaneously ideas that cannot in fact be reconciled. And on these
grounds we must, I think, leave the matter cautiously unresolved, not least
because Plato himself seems content to do so.
If one of the so-called ‘pillars of Platonism’ has so far proved to be
no real pillar at all and the other one perhaps shaky, are we to conclude
that the search for something generally characterizable as a ‘Platonic
approach’ to philosophy, whether in terms of method or the elaboration
of certain basic tenets, or both, is not going to prove fruitful? That would,
I think, be a hasty conclusion, given how much more there is going on in
the dialogues than what those two pillars constitute, and it is to some of
these things that I now turn.
First, the method. It is very possibly the case (though who could ever
prove it?) that, in his earliest dialogues, Plato himself, along with Socra-
tes, adhered to the view that the value of dialogue is the technique rather
than any hope of a positive conclusion to the argument, and that such a
technique constituted both the correct approach to philosophy and the
nature of philosophy itself. And also possibly the case that, as his writing
life progressed, he came to think that the technique could actually produ-
ce positive results, such as the definition of justice in the Republic, the
Theory of Forms, and the doctrine of immortality. On such a scenario it
could reasonably be argued that the fil conducteur uniting both of these
periods in Plato’s writing life was a commitment, and a commitment he
never abandoned, to the dialogic method as the most appropriate appro-
ach to philosophy, whether or not it also actually constituted philosophy
as such. This would remain true even if, as seems to be the case, the
quality of the dialogue tended to decline in some of the later works, such
as to be on occasion so exiguous (as in, say, the Timaeus) as to be barely
apparent. Had he really wished to abandon the method he would presu-
mably have done so by the time of the writing of his last work, the Laws,
but it is in fact still very much present there, with some lively interven-
tions at various points by the Athenian Stranger’s two companions.
As far as major philosophical tenets that go hand in hand with the
technique are concerned, I would single out psycho-physical dualism, a
belief in providential divinity, a teleological vision of the world, a func-
tionalist and essentialist metaphysics, physics, psychology and ethics,
and a specific commitment to the view that justice in the soul and in
society is a state of balance within each; and along with these a belief in
the soundness of a number of maxims often thought of as quintessential-
ly ‘Socratic’, such as ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’, ‘no-one
does evil wittingly’, ‘it is always better to be the recipient of evil than to
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commit it’, and in general terms, the worst evil I can perpetrate on ano-
ther person is to make him or her worse as a person.
To look briefly at each of these: the psycho-physical dualism seems
clear enough, despite Plato’s ongoing puzzlement about the details,
which pre-occupy him for a lifetime. The same can be said for his views
on divinity, which range all the way from some of the popular beliefs
found in the various eschatological myths to the astral theology that cha-
racterizes the Laws; what is invariant is his view that God/the gods/the
divine is rational, providential and wholly just –a notion absolutely revo-
lutionary for the Greece of his day.
Equally striking (and revolutionary) are his teleological vision of the
world, and his functionalism and essentialism. These extraordinarily in-
fluential notions, which underpin Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and a
great swath of philosophical speculation till relatively recent times, are to
be found as simple presuppositions from the earliest dialogues on, and are
finally explicitly argued for in some detail in the closing pages of Republic 1.
In contemporary terms, Plato’s is a ‘thing’ ontology rather than a ‘fact’
ontology, where the mind sees objects rather that appreciates states of
affairs, and his ethical system one in which actions and objectives are
characterizable in terms of what they are deemed to be essentially and
absolutely, rather than in terms of simply their consequences.
As far as the so-called ‘Socratic’ maxims are concerned, all are retained
by Plato to the end. And, it could be argued, implemented too; if in the
dialogues we are looking for a distinctive Platonic approach to philosophy,
we probably need look no further than his determination to keep on doggedly
re-examining, following Socrates’ maxim, what he took to be matters of
vital importance for the living of a truly virtuous (and hence truly fulfilled)
life. Like the nature of justice, and of a just society, tackled at great length,
and from a multiplicity of angles, in three complete dialogues as well as
more briefly in others. Or the notion that no one does evil wittingly, which is
still exercising him –and puzzling him– in extreme old age, as he writes the
Laws. Or the notion that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. It is, of its
nature, an approach which involves an openness to change, even major
change, of view on topics of central importance, even though, paradoxi-
cally, Plato was himself attracted to order and balance, and, if possible,
total changelessness once such order and balance is achieved, especially
in the realms of art and politics. If unnumbered searchers after truth find
themselves instinctively drawn to the honesty and integrity of such an
approach, whatever their views on anything else he adhered to, it is hard-
ly surprising. And any who might feel inclined to dispute it face a strong




[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] I would like to start with a twofold question.
First, on the matter of evolution in Platonic dialogues, and, second, on
the dialogues understood as synousia.
First of all, then, we must bear in mind as an interpretative principle
that Platonic dialogues constitute complete works on their own. If we do
not understand them as totalities, we run the risk of failing to understand
them. As happens with Shakespeare’s works, each one has its own sen-
se when taken as a whole; any fragments from them are to be unders-
tood in the context of the whole of a given work. Whether, after the fact,
we can talk about a possible ‘evolution’ of doctrine in the Platonic dialo-
gues remains open to question. We must also bear in mind the indissocia-
ble interconnectedness present in Platonic dialogues –as in all works, in
general– between form and content, as Schleiermacher emphasized.
Secondly, in Platonic philosophy, the character Socrates invariably
appears in dialogical meetings, in synousia with various interlocutors.
For these meetings, Plato offers us details on the place, the situs, where
the discussion takes place: we must bear in mind that dialectical discus-
sion invariably happens in a place. Thus, it can be, and in fact, is the
case, that in the dialogue dealing with philia there is in fact failure to
reach a definition (or, put differently, it is an aporetic dialogue), but if we
look at what happens in the situation in which the dialogue takes place,
we find that philia has in fact been realized. I maintain, increasingly
strongly, that philosophy is always a matter of synousia, a question of a
way of life in dialogue with the other.
[T. M. ROBINSON] When I speak of development or evolution of the
dialogues, I mean a simple change, not a finality. Plato had a philosophic
mind and, naturally, he changed it with the passage of time. I agree
with you that every dialogue is a perfect, finished entity, but Plato
wrote over a period of 50 years and it can reasonably be expected that
he changed some of his views with the passage of time. However, I
repeat that I am using the term change in a weak sense. Yes, every dialo-
gue is a finished entity, but we must remember that we possess a distan-
ce which allows us to have a sight of the whole of Plato’s work, and this
lets us see with some precision various shifts in perspective that may
well have passed unnoticed by Plato himself, being as he possibly was
too close to them.
Regarding the second topic, synousia, we must remember that philo-
sophy is a lived thing. Socrates and Plato were agreed on a philosophic
way of life: dialogical activity with friends. And the Platonic dialogue
reflects these discussions. Only friends can participate in a genuine dis-
cussion of philia. Only just people can engage in genuine discussion of
justice. There can be no genuine discussion of virtue if it is not philoso-
phically realized in the virtuous experience and conduct of the interlocu-
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tors. The form of the dialogue and the virtue of the soul of the interlocu-
tors influence each other.
[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] We agree, then, on the nature of the dialogical,
and on a weaker sense of the term ‘evolution’ as simply ‘change’. However,
since every work is complete, it does not make sense to search for the
possible evolution of concepts or terms outside of the work’s context,
and focused on some supposed final term of that evolution. Synousia is
not something terminal: it is that working state, typical of human nature,
which wills to live with the specific excellence (areté) which dignifies
human life. Excellence is realized in the active work of excellence itself.
And this work to achieve human excellence requires time.
[T. M. ROBINSON] You cannot become a Platonic philosopher simply
by reading books. You need to philosophize and to be a good person, and
the activity of philosophizing must also involve at least two people. It is
not possible to be good while being simply an atomic individual. The
virtuous life involves talking with others. Such speech in turn influences
virtue. And none of this is possible without the engagement of a mini-
mum of two discussants.
[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] What you say is true, and it is also true that there
are a number of ideas and commitments that pervade Plato’s works (cf.
the text of your paper). There are deep convictions there which form an
essential core of dialectic, a core which gives life its sense.
[T. M. ROBINSON] That is indeed the theme of my paper. I think that
the convictions in question are constituted in large part by the famous
‘maxims’ of Socrates (and Plato). Rather than seeing Plato simply as a
builder of systems, by contrast with a purely ‘dialogical’ Socrates, I
think that Plato is in fact deeply Socratic in these commitments, which
lie at the heart of any system he builds.
[J. SALES] Certainly, the position of Vlastos is unacceptable because it
projects weak moral positions as good Socratic moments, and strong
metaphysics as bad Platonic moments. This does lead us anywhere.
I think it is more appropriate to deal with the possibility of getting
Platonists to try to understand what a Socratic logos is, as opposed to
other logoi sokratikoi. Reducing Plato’s writings to various Socratic
maxims does not distinguish them from the works of other Socratics,
when it is clear that Plato is critically positioning himself against various
Socratic schools, such as the Megarians in the Theaetetus, the Pythago-
reans in the Phaedo, or the Cynics in the Symposium....
Plato’s message is that the examined life is favored by the law of the
whole (cf. Gorgias). To realize the Socratic command, you cannot break
with either the city or the world. This is the strong sense of synousia: a
law of whole, harmony and friendship. Emphasizing the methodical cha-
racter of the dialogues leads to a loss of the demand for a law of the
whole. Moral philosophy is warranted by what the wise person disco-
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vers, i. e., the world, or cosmos (cf. Callicles). If people in the city live
in discord something is lost.
So it is not a matter of defining a doctrine, but highlighting the axis by
which Plato goes further than other Socratics.
Apart from that, there is a complication in Platonic writing, arising in
a quite simple way from the dialogue between two people, and it mani-
fests itself in the compositive juggling of narrative form. The most re-
markable evolution, however, is an evolution of literary form in such a
way as to direct, a complex topic in itself: wisdom is not achieved against
the polis or the cosmos.
[T. M. ROBINSON] Vlastos was certainly a great interpreter of Plato,
but on the matter of Socrates I think with you that he was in some
respects deeply wrong. Plato is profoundly Socratic, not just because of
his undying adherence to the famous Socratic maxims, but also because
the idea of harmony with the other, with the polis, and with the world,
never left him. He was a continuation of Socrates in that regard too, a
Socrates himself bound by a Greek imperative to live the life of a polites.
Plato could of course both agree at times with Socrates and on occa-
sion offer arguments that would distinguish him from the master. But at
base each is committed to a search for the optimal situation for the big-
gest world (the cosmos), the smallest world (the polis), and the micro-
cosmos that is man.
[X. IBÁÑEZ] I really agree with what has been said, and I would like to
offer support for Prof. Sales’ statements about the law of the whole. I
wish to recall, first of all, the mimetic character of Platonic dialogues.
The Platonic dialogues are fragments of life. The reader does not attend
to them by listening to them, but also by watching them. By his use of
the dialogical method Plato invites us to attend as spectators, and even to
enlarge the conversation. The reader is invited to watch, not only with
regard to method, but also with regard to context or situation. Because
the whole cannot be put into words, but mimesis of the whole may be
shown. Plato plays with spaces and times in order to constitute «entire-
ties» for the reader to grasp. Thus, the reader is located in a «divine»
position. Let’s consider the Euthyphro, for instance. In the opening sce-
ne, Euthyphro is presented as an innovator in religious matters, able to
make predictions. According to him, all his predictions have been ac-
complished. However, later, just before the conversation about mercy
starts, he makes a prediction: he foresees that the trial of Socrates will
have a good ending. Obviously, this does not say anything from an intra-
dialogical point of view; but, if we watch it from the outside, from the
reader’s position, this one prediction makes us understand, even if the
dialogue has not already shown it, nor Socrates already said it , that this
character is a fake, since we, the readers (like Plato when he wrote the
dialogue!), already know that the trial of Socrates did not have a good
ending. In the Euthyphro, Plato plays the role of God (since he entirely
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dominates the drama which is presented in the dialogue, because he in
fact knows how the trial ended) and gives the reader the role of fortune-
teller (because we already know how it ended, too). The example is good
for illustrating what we have said: by showing us the scene in its entirety,
Plato makes us watch what we are listening to in order to understand, as
attentive spectators, the sense of all that is being said and all that happens
in the light of the complete ensemble of the situation of those who are
speaking.
I would like, secondly, to pose two questions. The first: in your pa-
per, it is clear that one of the constants of Platonic teaching is the dialo-
gue form. What do you attribute this to? What is the relation, according
to you, of the form of Platonic thought to its content?
And the second: you said that the Apology of Socrates presents an
atypical case, that it is an exceptional dialogue. I completely agree. My
question is: Which dialogue is not exceptional? If I compare them in
twos, I cannot find any two dialogues built in the same way: each Plato-
nic dialogue is different from all the others!
[T. M. ROBINSON] I will start with the last question. I entirely agree: all
the dialogues are unique in various ways. But I would like to remark that
the peculiarity of the Apology regards its dialogic nature or, more exac-
tly, its nature as a token representation of a trial. If we look at other
places dealing with the immortality of soul (such as the Phaedo), I do
not think that the Socratic position held in them is the same. The Socra-
tes of the Apology is agnostic because, in my opinion, he is there more
genuinely Socrates, and in the Phaedo he argues in favor of immortality
because, it sems to me, he is in that dialogue more representative of
Plato’s own personal views
As for the other questions: we are more than just spectators. We are
invited to participate in the dialogues, all of us, and to involve ourselves
in the Platonic method. And the Platonic method in turn involves us in
participation in dialogue after the Socratic fashion, where one is always
taking a ‘further step’.
[JOSEP MONSERRAT] Yes, but then we look just like the heroine in the
film The Purple Rose of Cairo, by Woody Allen. I mean, we can study
Plato and involve ourselves in his moralizing and philosophical ‘Socratic’
dialogues, projecting ourselves onto the scene and the characters, or we
can also study Plato himself, and see how he has built the film, which
techniques he has used, how has he set up the material, which effects he
pursues... More the role of a film-critic. This would also count as an
academic approach, would it not ?
[T. M. ROBINSON] You pose an important difficulty. But I want to
remind you of what Plato says in Republic VII, in the allegory of the
cave, where the film was first invented. We can satisfy ourselves by
simply watching how the puppet-masters move the pieces which project
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the shadows; but should we not follow the way of the philosopher, as-
cending first to the upper world in order to see the things that really are
and, afterwards, descending again into the cave? The process presented
is fundamentally dialectical, and there is a need of involvement with Plato
in a synousia, in a philosophical life –engagement throughout the argu-
ment and further. We should see the arguments, and get involved with
them, in the context of a life like that presented to us by Plato as a Socra-
tic invitation to goodness.
[XAVIER IBÁÑEZ] On the question of what you said before about not
being simple spectators: When I said Plato invites us to watch I was not
saying, of course, that we should be passive spectators. We have to be
active, intelligent spectators, people who think about what they see and
hear. I think, then, that we agree. What you say about participation, about
the «one further step», was implicit in my reference to the attendance to
dialogue. [Cf. Jordi Sales, «Assistir al diàleg, assistir el diàleg», intro-
duction a J. Monserrat, El polític de Plató (1999).]
[CARME MERCHÁN] I understand that you are clearly presenting an
approach to philosophy which looks for harmony with the world and the
polis. But is this peculiar to Plato? I think we could find the same appro-
ach in other philosophers.
[T. M. ROBINSON] I stressed the matter in the case of Socrates and
Plato because thy stand at the very beginning of this deeply Greek idea.
Afterwards, obviously, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc., continued the commit-
ment to this ideal.
[A. BOSCH] Time points to the end of this meeting. Mr. Robinson,
thank you very much for your participation. And thanks to all present for
your attendance. We hope T. M. Robinson will come back to Barcelona
on one of his frequent trips to our continent.
